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The Processual Ordering of Mental Health Care: 
The Rhetorical Styles of Contending Political Factions 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The processual ordering branch of symbolic interaction has long recognized the importance 
of rhetoric and power to the social constitution of reality.  However, little systematic effort 
has been devoted to probing their intertwined effects in the public policy arena. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to employ the processual ordering perspective to examine the 
dramaturgical styles used in shaping public policy -- expressed in terms of the “public 
administration” and “realpolitik” forms of rhetoric -- among contending political factions as 
they negotiate mental health public policy.  A latent content analysis of the minutes of key 
U.S. Congressional debates, augmented with secondary archival material from the press is 
employed.  It is concluded that both forms of rhetoric play a role in shaping public mental 
health policy and that both factions modify their rhetorical form as the debate progresses.  
Those modifications strengthen the position of one faction while weakening that of the 
other.  Theoretical implications are discussed.  
 Affordability and accessibility, in my view, are the two important words.  
Forget all the others - - affordability; accessibility . . . I do not want to be 
misunderstood. In the Republican minority’s proposal] you will not find the 
National Health Board.  You will not find price controls.  You will not find 
mandates and you will not find new taxes.  You will not find these because 
our bill is not based on the principle we have to get more government.  I 
think it is based on the principle that the American people know best. 
(Senator Robert Dole, Rep., Kansas, *S11012) 
 
Health care reform plans designed to make health care more accessible and 
affordable would continue the discrimination prevalent in private health 
insurance today.  Many plans allow 365 days for in-patient physical care, but 
only 45 days of in-patient psychiatric care; provide unlimited coverage of 
office visits for physical care, but only 20 visits for psychiatric care; and 
provide up to $1 million in lifetime coverage for physical care, but only 
$50,000 lifetime coverage for mental health care.  These are discriminations 
that we cannot let continue, especially if we reform the health care programs, 
more particularly if we reform the insurance programs of our Nation.  
(Senator Pete Domenici, Dem., New Mexico,  *51849) 
 
Use of appropriate rhetoric has long been recognized as essential to the social 
constitution of reality within a number of literatures.  For example, the processual ordering 
perspective (Strauss, 1993; Prus, 1999; Ulmer, 1997) has recognized the importance of 
rhetoric in probing such forms of human interaction as negotiations, conflict, manipulation, 
coercion, exchange, and power brokering in the constitution of organizational structures, 
rules, laws and societal expectations.  Similarly, social movement theory (e.g., Clemens and 
Cook, 1999; Rao et al., 2000) and the emerging literature on deliberative democracy (e.g., 
Dryzek, 2000; Wolfensberger, 2000) have reasoned that social change and the development 
of new public policies are influenced by their connection to societal values through use of 
appropriate rhetoric. And yet surprisingly, given Berger and Luckmann’s early observation 
that institutions are “built upon language” (1966, p. 64), symbolic interaction research 
directed at probing the role of rhetoric has been generally lacking, especially in examining 
the role of political language in shaping national policies (Hall, 1997; Prus, 1999).  
Moreover, while processual ordering theorists (e.g., Hall, 1997; Prus, 1999) have 
recognized that the application of power must be carefully examined in the social 
constitution of reality, the intertwining of human agency and rhetoric in the covert exercise 
of power has received little research attention, especially concerning the formation of 
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national health care policy (Marmor, 1999). Indeed, this neglect is unfortunate in view of 
the rise of the “new rhetoric” which focuses its attention on political rhetoric in the hope of 
isolating genres of discourse which underlie and support various political factions (e.g., 
Berkenkotter and Huckin, 1995; Freedman and Medway, 1994). 
Drawing upon the processual ordering perspective, as well as a select portion of 
literature dealing with political rhetoric (March and Olson, 1983; Prus, 1999), the purpose of 
this article is to examine the role of rhetoric and the covert application of power in shaping 
national policy toward the provision of health care in general, and mental health in 
particular.  We will proceed by examining U. S. congressional debates over a number of 
sessions in the 1990’s, with reference to such positions taken by political actors as quoted 
at the beginning of this paper. Rather than being seen as merely interesting theoretical 
issues, however, rhetoric and power are examined as complicit in not only impacting 
healthcare fiscal policies, wherein healthcare spending exceeds $1 trillion yearly, or nearly 
15% of the U.S.’s gross domestic product, but also what and how various segments of 
American society are cared for (Marmor, 1999; Covaleski, et al. 1993; Shortell and Hughes, 
1988; Weiner and Strauss, 1997). 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND CENTRAL RESEARCH QUESTION 
 
The Processual Ordering Perspective 
The processual ordering branch of symbolic interaction (e.g. Strauss, 1993; Prus, 
1999; Ulmer, 1997; see also Clark, 1991; Strauss, 1978; Maines, 1982; Maines and 
Charleton, 1985) is broadly concerned with examining social organization and structure as 
being mutually constituted with human agency and social interactions.  It focuses on the 
social construction of even a seemingly concrete reality by probing such human interaction 
strategies as negotiation, conflict, manipulation, coercion, exchange, bargaining, collusion, 
power brokering and rhetoric, which are circumscribed by, and yet interpenetrated with, 
existing rule systems, norms, laws and societal expectations (Strauss, 1993, p. 255; Ulmer, 
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1997, p. 23; Ulmer, 2005).  Maines (1982, p. 278) observed that “It is not just that new 
processes lead to new structural arrangements, or that structural change leads to 
associated procedural change … but that structural arrangements exist in and through 
processes that render those structures operative.”  Thus conceived, the formal structure of 
Federal laws and Congressional mandates are not seen as disassociated, or somehow 
located “out there,” apart from, or exogenous to underlying social processes, but rather, 
must become embodied in these very social processes (Manning, 1992).  Although material 
conditions play a central role, more abstract concerns for symbolic displays are also 
essential:  “All interaction is interpretive, assigning meaning to objects, events, scenes, 
settings, or contexts and relationships.  This interpreting need not be fully conscious, 
recognized, explicit, but also symbolizing is intrinsic to action and interaction (Strauss, 1995 
p. 151).  While “processual orders are the outcomes of past interaction processes that have 
become sedimented into institutional structure” (Ulmer, 1997, p. 25), processual ordering is 
a living, breathing process by which humans, collectively interacting, engender new working 
relations in an ongoing process of institutionalizing new structures, rules and laws.  
 More specifically, processual ordering views human group life as:   
(a) inter-subjective and linguistically mediated, (b) having multiple viewpoints and 
multifaceted notions of reality, (c) reflective, in which humans continually attribute meaning 
to actions, events and people, (d) action based, (e) negotiable, and (f) processual (Prus, 
1999, p. 126).  In turn, its basic propositions are that:  (1) interaction strategies are 
essential to the development, maintenance and transformation of institutional 
arrangements; (2) interaction strategies (e.g., negotiation, manipulation, power-brokering) 
may be expected to differ in their salience, and (3) specific social settings offer both 
opportunities and constraints as to the efficacy of particular interaction strategies.  Among 
contextual characteristics that may influence the selection of particular interaction strategies 
are: the relative availability and attractiveness to social actors; the perspectives and 
ideologies of actors; the biographical background of actors; the balance of power among 
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actors; and the visibility of interaction strategies of external constituents (Ulmer, 1997, pp. 
24-25). 
 Strauss (1993, pp. 228-229; the length of the quote should be forgiven given the 
central role it will play in interpreting the field observations), saw the application of 
processual ordering as especially useful for addressing a series of questions posed in public 
policy arenas: 
When representatives claim representation, how are others—both inside and 
outside the social world or social subworld—to judge their representativeness? 
Or to be linguistically mischievous, how in the world are the implicated worlds 
going to judge their representativeness?  In these policy arenas, 
governmental agencies often claim to be neutral. Yet they are scarcely so. 
Nevertheless, unless they are relatively stable captives of certain 
organizations, be it business, labor, or whatever, then their participatory role 
may be more difficult to discern or prove, as arena participants well know.  
This nonneutrality adds to the turmoil of the arenas, by itself generating a 
jumble of issues. In arenas, there are no neutral parties, no neutral 
governments.  However strictly objective they may believe themselves, they 
are embroiled in what is generally called the “politics” of the arena, and are 
unlikely to be able to stay out of controversy. The larger point is that 
representation (i.e., representing) is not simply an issue, but a process that is 
basic to arenas. 
 
Here are other important processes.  First and foremost in any arena, is 
probably the defining of issues. Given the multiplicity of perspectives of the 
participants, much of the disputation, maneuvering, persuading, and 
negotiating has to do with defining the issues. 
 
Another arena process is the evolving of issues, for if the policy arena 
endures very long, then new aspects of issues are likely to proliferate, or new 
issues are likely to bud off from old ones.  This process is accompanied by 
another: the matching of social worlds and their representing organizations 
with the issues.  Matching is an active process, carried out by the 
participants.  They select and reject issues, and reshape them in accordance 
with their own images and aims.   
 
Another process is the getting involved with alliances, which brings a 
continual tension that exists between the perceived advantages of joining 
coalitions and the tendency toward pulling back into your own terrain. 
Although the participants may have very different and even conflicting 
perspectives toward a given issue, nevertheless they may conceive of 
themselves cooperating in some actions taken toward that issue.   
 
The intersecting of arenas is certainly also among the most consequential of 
generic arena processes.  It is evident that each arena whirls around within a 
galaxy of other arenas. An analyst must take this into account even if 
studying not the galaxy but a single arena, just as the participants in each 
world must take this into account. 
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Consistent with Strauss (1993), Hall and McGinty (1997) saw public policy as 
processual in nature in which the intentions of political actors are transformed as they seek 
to attain practical ends, in part by mobilizing resources and applying power through use of 
appropriate forms of language.  Power, in turn, is being increasingly recognized as 
important to processual orders, wherein it is “envisioned as a dynamic, socially constructed 
essence” (Prus, 1999 p. 4; see also Blume, 1954; Goffman, 1959; Klapp, 1964 for early 
formulations). Power is seen as an inter-subjective and collectively enacted human 
phenomenon brought into existence in the here and now through negotiation and rhetoric 
(Prus, 1999).   
 Interpreting power as relational in his interactionist research on public policy, Hall 
(1972) recommended that four dimensions of political power be examined: (1) negotiating 
over material resources; (2) using rhetorical strategies to define the terms of debate and 
manage impressions; (3) controlling the flow of information; and (4) symbolically mobilizing 
support in the form of controlling the flow of information.  He went on to theorize that while 
much political bargaining occurs backstage in the form of controlling the flow of information, 
much of it appears in the public view in terms of symbolically mobilizing support, and it is 
here that the rhetorical styles used by political factions shape the process and outcomes of 
debate.  Recognizing that a “basic element of politics is, quite simply, talk” (p. 51), Hall 
briefly observed that two distinctive linguistic or dramaturgical styles are administrative and 
political languages (pp. 50, 56, 69): 
The existence of the two major political parties means that on some level, 
and for most issues, there are contending definitions of the situation which 
compete for the attention and acceptance of the populace. Such contending 
definitions also serve to create the impression that there are real differences 
between parties, that the political process is open and that members of the 
society do have meaningful choices. Representatives of each party therefore 
strive to create impressions, images, and symbols supportive of their position. 
The verbal battle between those who are in office and those out of office is an 
ongoing affair. In American society there is unlikely to be a single definition of 
the situation. The concern of the politicians, however, is to be able to assert 
the dominant one, recognizing full well that tomorrow may bring a new 
dominance. The struggle is ongoing therefore as administrations manipulate 
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symbols in order to mobilize support and deactivate or insulate dissent, while 
the opposition seeks to expand its support by capitalizing on the alleged 
failures of the administration and the new issues of the day. At the same 
time, growing out of the nature of the two-party system, the proposed 
definitions often are not too dissimilar as they both seek to control the center 
of the political spectrum. (1972, p. 53). 
 
Hall (1987; see also Hall and McGinty, 1997) concluded that interactionists probing 
the concept of power have tended to emphasize the overt application of power between 
contending factions, as between Democrats and Republicans.  Instead, he advocated that 
research could more fully reflect a processual, interaction-orientation by examining the 
covert application of power, for example, by focusing on the role of rhetoric in passively 
shaping the terms of debate (see also Pfeffer, 1981).  Thus, our analysis does not focus on 
the political parties involved in the debate over health care, but rather, on the rhetorical 
strategies employed in representing positions (for illustrative interactionist work examining 
political parties, see Grills, 1994; Atkinson, 1995).  This focus has the potential for 
extending the processual ordering perspective, where it has been observed that there has 
been a paucity of qualitative field studies probing the role of rhetoric (e.g. Prus, 1999), 
especially within institutions where the application of power is more manifest and diverse 
(Hall and Wing, 2000). 
The Voices of ‘Public Administration’ and ‘Realpolitik’ 
 The purpose of an examination by March and Olson (1983) was to examine twelve, 
twentieth-century comprehensive Federal reorganization efforts with respect to two 
rhetorical strategies – public administration and realpolitik.  According to March and Olson 
(p. 292): 
These two rhetorics exhibit and reaffirm fundamental social values, 
particularly those associated with personal efficacy, with intention, interest, 
power and rational choice. 
 
Thus, these two rhetorics simultaneously support an interpretation of American life and 
serve as a basis for making short-run legislative decisions. Consequently they may prove 
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potent in influencing not wholly institutionalized policies that are in a state of flux (see also 
Dryzek 2000; Wolfensberger, 2000). 
 The first rhetorical strategy used by politicians is public administration.  This 
“voice” of reform speaks in terms of structures and procedures for facilitating efficiency and 
effectiveness of governmental operations, and invokes the decision criteria of rationality, 
neutrality and objectivity.  The aim of this voice is to embody these core values within 
bureaucratic structures, and their attendant chain of command, authority and responsibility, 
thus institutionalizing them above and beyond the political fray:   
Administrative orthodoxy emphasizes economy and control. It speaks of 
offices that could be abolished, salaries that could be reduced, positions that 
could be eliminated, and expenses that could be curtailed. It calls for strong 
managerial leadership, clear lines of authority and responsibility, manageable 
spans of control, meritocratic personnel procedures, and the utilization of 
modern techniques for management. It sees administration as the neutral 
instrument of public policies, and reorganization as a way of making that 
instrument more efficient and effective through the application of some 
simple principles of organizing. This voice presents and justifies its proposals 
in terms of their contribution: (1) to promote the better execution of the laws, 
more effective management of the executive branch and its agencies and 
functions, and expeditious administration of the public business; (2) to reduce 
expenditures and promote economy to the fullest extent consistent with the 
efficient operation of the Government; (3) to increase the efficiency of the 
operations of the Government to the fullest extent practicable; (4) to group, 
coordinate and consolidate agencies and functions of the Government, as 
nearly as may be, according to major purposes; (5) to reduce the number of 
agencies by consolidating those having similar functions under a single head, 
and to abolish such agencies or advisory functions thereof as may not be 
necessary for the efficient conduct of the Government; and (6) to eliminate 
overlapping and duplication of effort. (pp. 282-283) 
 
The second rhetorical strategy used by politicians is realpolitik.  This “voice” of 
reform holds that bureaucratic structures, claims to neutrality, objectivity and rationality all 
represent dangerous illusions--in that they “reflect victorious interests and establish a 
mechanism for future dominance”--unless contained by the values, beliefs and goals of 
various competing interest groups within the legislative process.  According to March and 
Olson (p. 283), bureaucratic structures and the everyday actions of governments, let alone 
government policy, are forged through struggle among contending political factions that 
include both the legislative and executive branches: 
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The rhetoric of realpolitik is an empirical and prescriptive counterpoint to an 
orthodox administrative perspective. To the emphasis on managerial control, 
it juxtaposes an emphasis on political control. It argues that any single 
individual has neither the cognitive capacity, nor the moral and 
representational standing assumed by the managerial perspective. The 
dangers of a too powerful executive are real; good government cannot be 
reduced to good administration; and congressional and interest group or 
party dominance in administrative affairs is a precondition for a good political 
system. 
 
Thus, any effort by political actors to modify policies, bureaucratic structures and the like, 
without attending to established networks of power and vested interests, are destined to 
failure (see also Clemens and Cook, 1999; Rao et al., 2000). 
 March and Olson (1983, p. 292) concluded that these two rhetorical strategies are 
not unique to the arenas of administrative reorganizations, but instead may be generalized 
to wider realms of American political life.  They observed that “it may be possible to extend 
some features of the interpretation we have made to a more general consideration of 
political institutions and processes, to the problems of governance.”  Our purpose is to 
develop such an extension by examining the role of the rhetorical strategies of public 
administration and realpolitik as contending political actors seek to influence government’s 
role in mental health care. 
 Integrating the processual ordering perspective and March and Olson’s (1983) 
examination of rhetorical styles, it is possible to state a central research question that will 
serve as the focus of our analysis: 
What roles do the public administration and realpolitik discursive styles play 
as contending political factions seek to negotiate, manipulate, delay, coerce, 
bargain and broker national public policy concerning mental health? 
 
RESEARCH METHODS 
 Consistent with our social constructionist, theoretical perspective, evidence was 
gathered through a latent content analysis of archival material.  Archival material took the 
form of both public records (Denzin, 1978), as well as press coverage of the events 
examined (e.g., Allison and Zelizer, 1999; Altheide, 1996). Public material included:  
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hearings minutes of the United States Congress relating to debates on health care 
coverage; position statements and platforms of various political actors; government reports 
and position statements, as well as response reports critiquing these positions; and press 
coverage, predominantly from the New York Times (Times), Wall Street Journal (WSJ), and 
Washington Post (Post). 
 Latent content analysis, in which the researcher serves as a research instrument in 
interpreting archival material (Van Maanen, 1988, 1995; Strauss & Corbin, 1990; Fine, 
1984), was deemed especially relevant in order to emphasize the inherent character of the 
archival material rather than on quantitative procedures of analysis.  According to Berg 
(2004, p. 107), latent content analysis represents an “interpretive reading of the symbolism 
underlying the physically presented data,” and thus focuses on “the deep structural 
meaning conveyed by the message.”  Although there are dangers inherent in drawing 
inferences from such symbolism, it is nevertheless a very useful approach in examining 
archival material suggestive of the exercise of power (Merton, 1968, pp. 366-370).  
Moreover, these dangers may be mitigated by incorporating independent, corroborative 
techniques, and including detailed excerpts from material examined to substantiate the 
researchers’ interpretations.  In the current study, the primary researchers independently 
examined material and reached a consensus as to its interpretation--analogous to 
establishing inter-rater reliability in quantitative analyses, although the processes are more 
social in character--and multiple archival sources were examined where possible.  
Quotations from the archival material are presented concurrently with the development of 
interpretations (Berg, 2004).  These efforts extend beyond normal measures for ensuring 
the trustworthiness of latent content analysis, for in our study, the social processes 
themselves helped authenticate their own veracity in that they involved a basic dialectic 
process between contending political factions, between thesis and antithesis, which helped 
engender our own synthesis (Mitroff and Mason, 1981). 
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 The primary groups of political actors examined were Democratic and Republican 
members of Congress, who were active in the debate concerning health care coverage in 
general, and mental health care coverage in particular, as well as the United States 
President and staff.  Congressional leaders included U.S. Presidential hopefuls.  Other actors 
included the press (although newspaper accounts were targeted, it is noteworthy that 
particular reporters were especially active in covering the events examined), and 
governmental agencies (e.g., the U.S. General Accounting Office).  
          
 January through March, 1994:  The Debate Begins and Derails 
The debate over mental health “parity,” revolving around the issue of whether 
mental health care should have the same level of insurance coverage as physical 
healthcare, has its genesis in the intersection of two series of events:  recent advances in 
treatment of mental illness, and a willingness to consider major changes in the means of 
paying for health care brought on by the rapid increases in health care costs.  Two major 
issues were debated: (1) should mental illness have the same insurance coverage as 
physical illness?  and (2) assuming that the same coverage is to be provided, who should be 
deemed mentally ill?   
Health care reform, one of several domestic issues emphasized by Bill Clinton during 
his campaign for the presidency, moved to the top of his agenda in the period between his 
election in 1992 and the inauguration in January, 1993, due largely to the budget deficit he 
faced (Starr, 1997).  However, the budget deficit was not the only impetus.  Large 
employers had experienced substantial increases in health costs, well above the rate of 
inflation, throughout the late 1980s and early 90s.  A number of major corporations and 
national labor unions endorsed government regulation to force all employers to pay for their 
workers’ health care, as a means of leveling the playing field and avoiding cost shifting 
(Swenson and Greer, 2002).  Thus, health reform also served as a point of agreement with 
a political constituency generally more conservative than the President.  This was 
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particularly important given the narrow margin of the election. President Clinton appointed 
his wife, Hillary Rodham Clinton, an attorney experienced in public policy matters, to head a 
task force charged with developing a plan to offer universal coverage to the U. S. 
population.  Representative Engle (D, NY) observed that: 
Whatever bill we pass must have comprehensive mental health benefits.  
Mental health benefits should not be a second thought; mental health benefits 
must be on a par with any other benefits that we offer in any final bill that 
passes this legislature (Congressional Record, House, March 9, 1994, Vol. 
140. No. 25). 
 
Universal coverage was expected to be adopted, but perhaps to be curtailed to some 
degree to reduce the projected budget deficit.  Mental health and substance abuse benefits 
were included initially in the plan on March 16th, but there was doubt that they would 
survive the legislative process.  Mental health benefits were seen as particularly vulnerable: 
The fact of the matter is, if you had to find one single piece of the health care 
proposal which is vulnerable--one single piece of it--it would be mental 
health.  There are a lot of people around this country who are opposed to 
mental health benefits because they see it as stress in the workplace and not 
as serious problems. (Congressional Record, March 24, 1994, Vol. 140, No. 
35, Senator Rockefeller).     
  
Throughout this period, coverage in the press was mixed.  The WSJ was adamantly 
opposed to comprehensive health reform, calling the “Clinton Plan” “pathological” (January 
3, 1994, p. 6, col. 1).  Another article on the same page written by the mother of a child 
with severe impairments detailed her experiences:  
I can show Mrs. Clinton that programs like hers already exist.  I can show her 
the paperwork, the idiosyncratic rules, the insensitivity, the ill-trained workers 
and a bureaucracy as deep as the Mississippi at St. Louis.  I can show her a 
system that, much like her proposal, was intended to help.  The reality is that 
help rarely makes it to our Claire. 
 
Other WSJ headlines were unremittingly negative (e.g., January 25, 1994, Section B, p. 3, 
col. 1; January 26, 1994, Section B, p. 2, col. 3).  The WSJ reported being “stunned” when 
the American College of Surgeons endorsed the proposal (February 11, 1994, Section A, p. 
3, col. 1).  The headline “Small Businesses oppose Compromise Health Proposal (though 
they see it as less onerous than the Clinton Plan)” (February 25, 1994, Section B, p. 2, col. 
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3) demonstrates the tenor of the WSJ coverage.  Though this could be interpreted as a 
reporting of the news, the inflammatory language effectively revealed the WSJ’s position.   
The Times began its coverage (January 3, 1994, Section A, p. 14, col. 3) with an 
article that predicted major health care legislation.  Most of those quoted expected a 
comprehensive bill to pass, though they predicted that the original proposal would be 
substantially modified:   
Congress will pass a comprehensive bill in 1994.  The centerpiece will be 
universal coverage, perhaps phased in over a decade.  The final bill will have 
a passing resemblance to the Clinton proposal, but it will not be a close copy. 
. . It will place less reliance on government regulation and will have less 
bureaucracy than the President’s proposal. (Dr. Lonnie Bristow, chairman of 
the American Medical Association). 
 
Congress will pass a bill assuring health security to every American.  
Congress will recognize that anything short of that standard will not be 
viewed as adequate by the American people. (John C. Rother, director of 
legislation and public policy, American Association of Retired Persons). 
 
Congress will pass a comprehensive bill providing universal coverage.  The 
American people will not allow any other result.  It will resemble the Clinton 
plan more than any other proposal because he faithfully built his plan around 
Americans’ priorities. (Senator John D. Rockefeller, D, WV). 
 
It will be a tough legislative battle.  But by the end of the year, we will pass 
legislation that guarantees health insurance coverage to all Americans.  
Members of Congress will be reluctant to face voters in 1994 without being 
able to take credit for such legislation. (Representative Henry A. Waxman, D, 
CA). 
 
However, there were critical social actors who were less confident of the bill’s passage.  Of 
18 people quoted in the Times article, 13 thought legislation would pass and three thought 
it would not.  But among the seven legislators interviewed only four thought it would pass. 
Senator Nancy Landon Kassebaum (R, KS), ranking Republican on the Labor and Human 
Resources Committee, predicted that: 
I don’t think Congress will pass a comprehensive health bill in 1994.  There 
has been considerable slippage in support since the President’s speech to a 
joint session of Congress.  The public has grown increasingly confused about 
the complexity of this issue, and those who are opposed have managed to 
create further seeds of doubt.  The public worries about the cost and the 
ability to have choices in the system.  I’m just finding growing opposition.  
The question becomes, Should we do interim steps like insurance reform?  It 
seems more likely we will approach it that way. 
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By January 23, it was obvious that the Times had serious reservations about the 
proposal.  A tongue-in-cheek article (Section 13J, p. 13, col. 1, “New Jersey Weekly Desk”) 
presented a series of questions and answers about the plan.  It would be nearly impossible 
to mistake the tone of that article, which concluded that:  
Will doctors, employers, patients, and insurers be able to get along happily 
under the new system?  Assuredly.  For the first time in the history of New 
Jersey’s health care system, they will cease to be adversaries, since, under 
the new system, all will be equally confused.  Befuddlement will be impartial, 
without regard to race, creed, class or country of origin.  Indeed, universal 
ignorance of the provisions of the new system will be very much a blessing for 
all concerned.  Because, as everyone knows, ignorance is bliss. 
 
 In early February, the Times reported that several alternate proposals were 
advanced and that executives of large corporations opposed the breadth of the Clinton 
proposal which they felt would slow the economy.  In response, President Clinton vowed to 
veto any bill which did not provide universal coverage (February 2, 1994, Section A, p. 1, 
col. 4, National Desk).   
The Post was generally supportive of the Clinton proposal, and focused more on 
mental health issues than the other newspapers.  A January article featured excerpts from 
an interview with a practicing psychologist who declared the President’s plan had “pretty 
decent coverage” for such acute psychiatric problems as substance abuse, but was “woefully 
inadequate” to meet the needs of many seeking outpatient services.  He criticized the part 
of the plan that set limits on office visits as a “false economy:” 
When the 30 (visits annually) are over, they’ll save money in the short run.  
When we’ve got to hospitalize this person down the road, they’re going to feel 
the pain, whether or not they’re able to make the connection. (January 3, 
1994, final edition, p. A9) 
 
 
April through Early August 1994:  Behind the Scenes 
The Congressional Record had relatively little material during this period.  The debate 
had been scheduled for mid-August, and work was being done behind the scenes concerning 
the envisioned bill within committees. Both the House and the Senate developed proposals 
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competing with the Clinton plan.  However, most of the work took place out of the public 
eye or was not conveyed to the press (Hall, 1972). 
Coverage in the WSJ during this time subsided somewhat, and the limited discussion 
that did occur, tended to focus on costs.  An April 13 article presented a case for medical 
malpractice reform (Section A, p. 13, col. 3).  By Congressional Budget Office (CBO) 
estimates, a rival plan would leave millions of Americans without health care insurance and 
only moderately slow rising health expenditures, but would cut long-term deficits (May 4, 
1994, Section A, p. 5, col. 1).  A plan proposed by Senator Breaux (D, LA) (May 18, 1994, 
Section A, p. 2, col. 2) would shelter small businesses from part of the costs of health 
reform by increasing the contribution from companies with more than 1,000 workers.  
President Clinton, meanwhile, rejected Representative Gingrich’s (R, GA) call for 
suggestions to shore up Medicare’s finances, saying that he would accept Medicare cutbacks 
only as a part of overall health reform (May 2, 1994, Section A, p. 20, col. 1).  An article on 
May 19 (Section B, p. 8, col. 1) described the results of a study demonstrating that the 
mental health benefits outlined in the President’s plan could be expanded at no extra cost, 
perhaps surprising in light of earlier coverage of the topic in the WSJ. 
Between April and July 1994, the Post featured articles calling for caution, which 
focused on potential shortcomings of the proposed legislation.  These voiced a concern that 
current levels of public hospital funding would be insufficient to care for the poor (April 24, 
1994, First Section, p. A6), and that the costs of mental health care could not be reliably 
estimated because coverage of that type had been generally unavailable (July 25, 1994, 
First Section, p. A6).  However, an August 6 letter to the editor (p. A18) disagreed with that 
claim: 
When outpatient therapy is free, 4.3 percent of the population uses it, and 
the average length of treatment is 11 sessions.  Psychotherapy produces a 
net reduction in health care costs:  The most comprehensive analysis, 
covering 58 studies, shows that on average, outpatient psychotherapy lowers 
medical utilization by as much as 33 percent; a subset of studies regarding 
inpatient usage showed a 73.4 percent reduction in hospitalization.  A study 
of 4.5 million military dependents covered by the federal CHAMPUS health 
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program showed that for every dollar spent on outpatient psychotherapy, four 
were saved in psychiatric hospitalization costs. 
 
The Times provided far more coverage during this period than the other two 
newspapers.  In general, coverage appeared objective and informative, while recognizing 
the problems the legislation faced in the road to enactment. An editorial in early May (May 
11, 1994, Section A, p. 24, col. 1) described Senator Kennedy’s (D, MA) proposal as “the 
first serious effort to reach out to Republicans for a needed bipartisan compromise.” A series 
of later articles (i.e., May 15, 1994, Section 4, p. 1, col. 1; May 19, 1994, Section A, p. 24, 
col. 1; June 6, 1994, Section A, p. 14, col. 5; June 8, 1994, Section A, p. 1, col. 3; July 21, 
1994, Section A, p. 1, col. 1) detailed problems being encountered by the legislation. Two 
articles (July 22, 1994, Section A, p. 20, col. 4; June 12, 1994, Section 4A, p. 3, col. 1) 
attempted to help people understand the problems, alternative approaches to a solution, 
and some of the differences between the various proposals. The Times generally appeared 
to support universal coverage, but not mental health parity. 
In early July, the Senate committee developed a plan that would cover 95% of 
Americans.  The Times printed a letter to the editor outraged by that plan.  The writer 
proposed that 5% of Senators lose their medical coverage: 
If having no health insurance is good enough for more than 17 million 
Americans, it’s good enough for five United States Senators.  If it is not 
satisfactory to the Senate to have five senators in their midst with no health 
insurance, let Congress pass a system that covers all Americans with 
complete coverage for mental illness, including the substance abuse disorders 
coverage that the senators and representatives themselves enjoy.  Let the 
senators walk in the shoes of those they represent. (July 15, 1994, Section A, 
p. 26)  
 
 
August 1994:  The Universal Coverage Debate 
During August, the competing health care reform proposals came to Congress for 
debate.  The lines were clearly drawn.  Senator Mitchell (D, ME), the majority leader, 
introduced the “Mitchell Bill.” Using the voice of realpolitik, Mitchell called for significant 
changes to bring about basic “fairness for all Americans”: 
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Health insurance for all Americans is the key to reform.  Without it, we face a 
continuation of cost shifting and other problems . . . If the states can demand 
that auto insurers cover the risks resulting from bad driving-behavior that can 
be controlled and influenced and prevented - it is not beyond our ability to 
require health insurance companies to cover those whose conditions often do 
not arise from their behavior but from circumstance and from just plain bad 
luck (August 2, 1994, Congressional Record, Senate, Vol. 140, No. 104).   
 
However, Senator Mitchell anticipated that the Bill would encounter significant 
opposition from those wielding the voice of public administration: 
Human beings are made anxious by change.  It means uncertainty.  So that 
every major change in our Nation’s history has been bitterly fought.  Those 
who oppose change have tried to transform people’s natural anxiety into fear.  
It sometimes worked for a while.  But when fully informed, Americans have 
looked to the future with the same optimism and courage that have been our 
Nation’s distinguishing values.  I believe it will be so with health care reform, 
as it was with Social Security and Medicare.  They are so strongly supported 
now that across the distance of history it is hard to figure out what all the 
fuss was about (ibid). 
 
Senator Kennedy (D, MA) pointed out that every other industrialized nation in the 
world except South Africa had already acted to ensure that all its citizens have health 
insurance, and pleaded using the voice of realpolitik: 
Every member of the Senate I am sure has talked to as many people as I 
have, people, who through no fault of their own, have crushing health and 
financial burdens because the health insurance system has let them down.  As 
we approach each vote, I ask you to remember these individuals.  They 
desperately need your help.  They are not Harry and Louise.1  They have no 
trade organizations.  They have no lobbyists.  They cannot spend thousands 
of dollars in advertisements to fight reform.  The only power they have lies in 
our votes and in our commitment to serve the people, not special interests.  
We in the Congress are fortunate.  We have guaranteed health insurance paid 
for in large part by our employer.  Is it not about time we did the same for 
the people who employ us (ibid)? 
  
Senator Dodd (D, CT) felt it was important to close the holes in the existing 
insurance system and felt pressure to do so: 
It is an irony that in the America of today, if you are on welfare, you can get 
health care.  If you are in prison, you can get health care.  If you are a 
Member of Congress, you can get health care.  But if you are a middle-class 
American who gets up and goes to work every day to a job without 
coverage, then you can’t get health care.  That’s what this debate is about . . 
. We haven’t had a debate like this for decades, and if we fail this year, we 
won’t have another one for decades more (ibid).  
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Senators Dole (R, KS) and Packwood (R, OR) jointly sponsored a counter proposal 
offering guaranteed access to coverage with subsidies for those with low incomes (August 9, 
1994, Congressional Record, Senate, Vol. 140, No. 109).  Senator Dole spoke with the voice 
of public administration:  
We are trying to figure out, all of us or most of us, how we can assist those 
people (who are in great need) without damaging the best health care system 
in the world . . . Affordability and accessibility, in my view, are the two most 
important words . . . We believe we can do that without new taxes, without 
having the Government tell you what will be included in your health 
insurance, and without, in many areas, putting Federal bureaucrats in charge 
of your health care system (ibid). 
 
Senator Packwood raised a topic that remains unthinkable to most Americans-- the overt 
rationing of health care.  Using the voice of public administration, he stated: 
If we would just sit back and let the market work-it is going to work well for 
the next 5 or 6 years.  The competition is just setting in.  The reason I say for 
the next 5 or 6 years is because at some place you are going to reach an 
irreducible minimum below which a hospital cannot operate and it goes 
bankrupt.  You are going to reach an irreducible minimum in which a doctor 
says ‘I’m no longer going to practice medicine, I’m going to be a plumber and 
make more money.’  He goes out and becomes a plumber.  At that stage, 
competition cannot squeeze any more out.  No bill-not the Mitchell bill, the 
chairman’s bill, not Dole-Packwood addresses the ultimate problem which is 
really a theological problem.  It is not a medical problem.  How much of our 
gross domestic product do we want to spend on medicine?  The doctor can 
tell you, in all likelihood, how long you are going to live or how long your 
parent might live.   The decision whether to keep them alive for 3 months or 
9 months, and maybe the difference in 6 months is a couple of hundred 
thousand dollars, is not a medical decision.  Maybe it is a financial one for 
you, or a theological one.  America has not come to that yet.  Interesting, 
most of the socialized countries have.  They cannot afford not to.  In England, 
you might not get kidney dialysis if you are over 65.  They have better things 
to do with the money.  I plead with this Congress, this Senate; do not pass a 
bill that attempts to regulate us into what cannot be regulated.  And the 
danger is once we start down this road, as every other country has learned, 
trying to undo it becomes almost impossible (ibid). 
 
Senator Kerry (D, MA) noted the paradox posed by the two opposing voices, while 
expressing his own preference for the public administration perspective: 
In particular we must take care not to allow the urgent need to subsidize 
those who cannot pay health care bills to dominate the need to contain costs.  
Every significant Federal intervention to expand coverage this century -- tax 
deductibility, Hill-Burton, Medicare, Medicaid -- has increased the demand for 
expensive care.  This demand has increased the availability of expensive 
health care.  Not surprisingly, this has made health care more unaffordable 
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and we are back where we began -- increased the demand for subsidies 
(ibid).  
 
Even Senator Domenici (R, NM), noted for his support of health care reform 
measures, and one of the most active voices of realpolitik, called for caution 
Let me state at the outset that I believe we should enact health care reform.  
I think there are things in the system we ought to correct, and some of those 
are very serious. I give the President of the United States, Senator Mitchell, 
Senator Dole, and a myriad of others, credit for putting this at the top of our 
agenda.  But as we move toward reforming our health care system, we in this 
Congress, like doctors who deliver health care, should take the Hippocratic 
oath to do no harm (ibid). 
 
Senator Araka (D, HI) presented information from his state’s twenty years’ 
experience with universal health insurance, jointly funded by employees and employers.  
Hawaii’s costs were 20% to 30% below the national average, despite its high cost of living.  
Longevity was high, infant mortality was low, and two recent analyses by independent 
organizations had rated Hawaii’s public health status first in all the U. S.  Contrary to dire 
predictions of the effects on small businesses, small business employment had increased. 
Two days later, Friday August 12, it was clear the debate had completely fallen 
apart.  In the Senate, Republicans were filibustering, and Democrats could not muster the 
sixty votes required to end the filibuster.  The House declined to debate  an alternate bill 
that its own members had developed.  On September 27, the Senate briefly discussed 
health care for those with disabilities and psychiatric problems, but again, nothing came to a 
vote. 
Nonetheless, the issue remained.  Senator Rockefeller (D, WV) quoted extensively 
from an election night poll in November 1994.  Results showed that Americans supported 
health care reform and identified it as their number one priority -- above economic stability, 
crime and taxes.  56 percent of voters said that Congress should take the lead in developing 
a health care plan.  Only 20 percent said that Congress should not try to see that more 
people have improved access to health insurance.  74 percent said that Congress should 
either guarantee coverage for all Americans, or at least make a start by covering some 
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groups who did not have health insurance.  A majority of voters favored beginning with 
children (Congressional Record, Senate, January 4, 1995, Vol. 141 No.1 Part II). 
 WSJ’s continued opposition to health reform can be detected in an article on August 
9 (Section A, p. 12, col. 1), which applauded Senator Gramm’s decision to “proudly oppose” 
the Clinton plan, and an article by economist Martin Feldstein which estimated that 
subsidizing health insurance would cost $100 billion a year, and raise personal taxes by 
nearly 20%.  Times’ articles were primarily informational, but some clearly favored the 
concept of universal insurance while urging caution. An editorial on August 12, 1994, 
(Section A, p. 23, col. 2) read in part: 
The history of the Social Security Act of 1935 suggests the risks of making an 
excessively rigid commitment to universal coverage.  When it was enacted, its 
benefits fell much shorter of universality than almost any health care measure 
now debated.  Huge categories of people were excluded.  When the first 
pension payments began, they reached fewer than a quarter of all workers 
and virtually no one outside the labor force.  Yet within four years, Congress 
began to expand the system.  Today, Social Security pensions are the closest 
thing we have to a universal system of social insurance.  Whatever its flaws, 
it is the most popular and politically unassailable social program the 
government has ever produced . . . On the other hand, the 1965 Medicare Act 
illustrates the dangers of establishing a principle of entitlement without an 
adequate structure for financing and containing it . . . The unintended 
consequences of Medicare are among the causes of today’s health care crisis.  
And they support Mr. Clinton’s argument that a system too far from 
universality could make things worse, not better, for people who need help 
the most. 
 
An article on August 16, 1994, (Section A, p. 1, col. 4) recounted stories from 
several Congressional Members being “badgered” by Lobbyists, and another (September 23, 
1994, Section A, p. 4, col. 2) reported that at least 20 percent of the money given to 
Congressional candidates during the election by political action committees and large 
individual donors came from those opposed to comprehensive health reform.  By the end of 
August, the Times accepted that little progress toward that goal was likely to be made, 
describing Congressional debate as “a last-ditch effort” to persuade members of both 
parties to adopt a modest proposal (August 25, 1994, Section A, p. 16, col. 1).  The Post, 
meanwhile, continued to call for small, incremental remedies to the health care crisis.  
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1995:  The Calm before the Storm 
Only two minor actions related to health care reform took place in Congress during 
1995, both during January.  The Family Health Insurance Protection Act to “provide for 
health care reform through the health insurance market reform and assistance for small 
business and families” was introduced.  The bill proposed:  banning discrimination by 
insurance companies based on health status; limiting pre-existing condition exclusions to six 
months; guaranteeing issue of small group policies; permitting insurance companies to 
refuse to renew coverage only due to nonpayment, fraud or misrepresentation; and 
requiring insurers to offer a designated plan (Congressional Record, Senate, January 4, 
1995, Vol. 141 No.1 Part II).  The Equitable Health Care for Severe Mental Illness Act of 
1995 was introduced on January 31, 1995.  Its intention was to provide, within whatever 
health reform package was enacted, treatment for severe mental illness “commensurate” 
with that for individuals with other diseases (Congressional Record, Senate, January 31, 
1995, Vol. 141 No. 19).  Neither proposal was ever debated in Congress. 
 The Post began the year (January 8, 1995, Outlook, p. C5) with an article outlining 
a potential Republican strategy:  
A Republican version of health care reform would hardly resemble the gargantuan 
Clinton plan that foundered in the last Congress.  But even a plan so lite (spelling in 
original) it had the flavor of rain water could have a major impact on health care—
and on voters.  First, it would dramatically show that the Republicans could break 
gridlock and do something the Democrats had failed to do . . . It would also say to 
voters—‘see, the GOP has a social conscience, despite the party’s roars about 
building orphanages and cutting welfare’ . . . Finally, it would leave the Democrats 
without their prime middle-class issue. 
 
A Paul Samuelson article (October 25, 1995, Op-Ed, p. A19), relying on a voice of 
public administration, demonstrated that the Post thought there was little need for any 
action because it had already taken place in the private market through admittedly under-
researched managed care: 
We often miss the most momentous social changes.  They occur without a 
defining event and, once completed, escape notice by their very normalcy.  
So it has been in health care, which in the past few years has undergone a 
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revolution . . . President Clinton envisioned such an upheaval in his 
unsuccessful 1993 health-reform proposal, but it has occurred without federal 
fiat and with stunning swiftness.  
 
The Times polls suggested, however, that a significant majority of citizens still 
preferred guaranteed health insurance for all Americans.  
1996:  Success!  Success.  Success?   
Mental health parity and health insurance reform were prime topics in Congress 
during 1996.  The Health Insurance Reform Act was introduced on April 18 (Congressional 
Record, Senate, Vol. 142, No. 50).  The bill guaranteed availability of group coverage for 
those who start with a new employer; guaranteed renewability of such coverage unless 
there was nonpayment or misrepresentation; limited preexisting exemptions to twelve 
months (except in the case of pregnancy, which would be covered immediately); and 
provided special enrollment periods for those who had changed family circumstances. This 
bill, known as the Kassebaum-Kennedy Bill, passed the Senate Labor and Human Resources 
Committee in August by a unanimous vote.  It enjoyed broad bipartisan support in 
Congress, as well as the support of a number of organizations, including several large health 
insurers and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce (p. 26).  Senator Kassebaum (R, KS) was 
quite direct in her introduction of the bill using a modified form of realpolitik. She stated 
that while it was a limited bill, it was a bill that could pass and would help a large number of 
Americans: 
Only a year after President Clinton waved his veto pen, said he would not sign 
any bill that did not contain universal coverage, the President now says he 
will sign this carefully targeted health insurance portability bill.  We should 
take him up on that offer.  The bill before us today does not achieve universal 
coverage.  It is a far cry from the comprehensive health reform proposals that 
were considered by Congress only in the last Congress.  However, it would 
immediately and immeasurably improve the lives of millions of Americans 
(Congressional Record, Senate, Vol. 142, No. 50). 
 
Senator Kennedy (D, MA) echoed Kassebaum’s appraisal, applied a bit of political 
pressure to help ensure its passage, and cautioned strongly against loading controversial 
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amendments onto the bill, modifying even further his traditional voice with practical, 
rational elements of public administration rhetoric: 
The Health Insurance Reform Act is a modest, responsible, bipartisan solution 
to many of the most obvious abuses in the health insurance marketplace 
today.  The bill was approved by the Senate Labor and Human Resources 
Committee last August by a unanimous vote of 16 to 0.  It is similar to 
proposals made by President Clinton in his recent balanced budget plan.  The 
measures it includes are also virtually identical to provisions of legislation 
offered by Senator Dole in the last Congress -- legislation supported by 
virtually every Republican member.  Sponsors range from the most 
conservative members of the Senate to the most liberal—because these 
reforms represent simple justice.  They are not issues of ideology or 
partisanship . . . I believe it will pass overwhelmingly—unless some in the 
Senate insist on following the Republican majority in the House of 
Representatives by addressing controversial and harmful provisions like [here 
a list appeared] . . . Medical savings accounts, which are included in a major 
amendment to be offered later in this debate are particularly objectionable.  
They are opposed by virtually every credible health policy expert.  They 
attract the healthy and the wealthy, and add up to an unjustified $1.8 billion 
Federal giveaway to those who need it least.  They are a gift to the insurance 
companies with the worst record of abusive practices—a poorly disguised 
reward for millions of dollars of campaign contributions.  And by pulling the 
healthiest individuals out of the conventional insurance market, they will raise 
premiums for everyone else, including those who need coverage most.  In 
fact, the Congressional Budget Office concluded ‘In the long run, the 
existence of any type of catastrophic plus MSA option that would be attractive 
to a large number of people could threaten the existence of standard health 
insurance.’  Members of the Senate who are serious about insurance reform 
should vote against all controversial amendments—including medical savings 
accounts.  Senator Kassebaum and I have agreed that we will vigorously 
oppose all such amendments—even those that we might support under other 
circumstances (ibid.). 
 
Other co-sponsors of the bill expressed the same sentiment.  For example, Senator 
Rockefeller (D, WV) observed: 
The people of our states are still writing, calling, visiting, and asking for help.  
I am going to do whatever I can do to make sure that we do not let this 
opportunity pass us by . . That is why we simply have to also exercise 
restraint and not kill this bill with extra baggage.  It is tempting, but it cannot 
happen.  Amendments, whether they are well-intentioned or not, which are 
controversial will have the effect of bringing this bill down, and we all know 
that.  We have to be very careful as we go through this exercise that we do 
not accept controversial amendments (ibid.). 
 
All such calls for caution, however, did not eliminate the threat of amendments.  
Senator Jeffords (R, VT, who changed to an independent in 2001) introduced an 
amendment to require lifetime caps of $10 million because otherwise, very low limits could 
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be instituted which would quickly leave people without insurance.  Another amendment was 
proposed to allow the self-employed to deduct the cost of health insurance.  These 
amendments proved not to be controversial and were readily accepted.  Two others proved 
quite controversial, however.  Senator Dole (R, KS) introduced an amendment to include 
MSAs, as did Representative Gingrich (R, GA) in the House, nearly killing the bill, as 
intended.  The Senate subsequently voted against MSAs, but the House included them.  It 
appeared that even establishing a committee to work out the final form of the legislation 
would be impossible.  Only a last minute compromise, which established a demonstration 
project limited to 750,000 participants from businesses with 50 or fewer employees, bridged 
the gap. 
That MSAs proved controversial is largely because of different perspectives of their 
likely effects.  A report prepared by the Congressional Budget Office, reflecting a public 
administration form of rhetoric, found that “a major reason for high and rapidly rising health 
cost is the failure of the normal discipline of the marketplace to limit the quantity of services 
supplied” (as quoted by Senator Coats (R, MI), ibid.).  Senator Coats also claimed that 
MSAs would achieve savings by reducing the administrative burden on our health care 
system since the number of small claims would be dramatically reduced.  The Times 
(January 18, 1996, Section D, p. 2, col. 1) reported a disconnect between the beliefs of 
Congress and those of health economists. Some members of Congress tended to believe 
that health care costs were high largely because of administrative costs and consumer 
choice: 
Most of the health care bills before Congress remind us of Henry Ford’s 
philosophy behind the Model-T car.  ‘You can have any color you want as long 
as it is black,’ (but) health care reform that includes medical savings accounts 
would represent real consumer sovereignty; patient self-interest would be 
harnessed to keep costs down, and workers would build up tax-free health 
care funds for when they were between jobs.  Health care security would be 
enhanced, but not at the cost of quality or freedom of choice (as quoted by 
Mr. Coats, ibid.).  
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The same article contrasted that belief with the views of health economists.  In 
response to a poll by Victor R. Fuchs, the outgoing president of the American Economic 
Association and a health economist at Stanford University, 81 percent of health economists 
agreed that “the primary reason for the increase in the health sector’s share of G.D.P. over 
the past 30 years is technological change in medicine.”  
The amendment for full mental health parity brought forward by Senators Wellstone 
(D, MN) and Domenici (R, NM) also proved controversial.  Senators Kennedy and 
Kassebaum opposed it, as they had promised.  The essentials of the debate were quite 
similar to the discussions of mental health care in 1994.  One exception related to the cost 
estimates, which were markedly lower.  Estimates for the current amendment amounted to 
a 1.6 percent increase in insurance premiums (Congressional Report, Senate, April 18, 
1996, Vol. 142, No. 50).  Additional information about costs in states with parity laws was 
also presented.  In the state of Minnesota, the cost estimate was 26 cents per person (as 
quoted by Mr. Wellstone, ibid.).  The sponsors were careful to point out that mental health 
care could be subject to the same managed controls as physical health care.  The same 
underlying realpolitik argument was used: “parity is an issue of fairness.”  Several members 
of Congress told personal anecdotes of those they had lost to mental illness in an attempt to 
persuade others to support the amendment.  However, a public administration emphasis 
quickly became focused on how limited were the incremental costs -- an about-face from 
1994.  
The measure was tabled in the Senate on April 18.  On May 12 (Congressional 
Record, Senate, Vol. 142, No. 59) it was reintroduced as part of the Working Families 
Economic Security Act of 1996, which, among other things, proposed raising the minimum 
wage.  The bill passed, but the mental health portion was deleted.   This particularly upset 
Senator Wellstone, because, he argued, the mental health amendment actually had strong 
support: 
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To me it is just unconscionable that this cannot be accepted.  I mean it 
passed by 68 votes.  I do not believe that this should now be knocked out of 
the mix. 
 
Senator Kennedy replied that he supported the amendment in principle, but that for the 
present, it was better to concede defeat: 
I come down on the side [of those who say to dismiss the parity proposal] 
because I fear, if we do a study, that may very well be utilized as a way to 
compromise further progress in addressing mental health down the road on 
some future health care proposal (ibid.) 
 
So, after long debate and dueling cost estimates, mental health parity was not 
included in the Health Insurance Portability Act.  The Act did, however, serve the interests 
of nearly 25 million Americans with pre-existing health problems who might want to change 
jobs in the future. 
However, only a few days later, Senator Domenici re-introduced the limited 
amendment he had previously introduced as a free-standing bill. But, this time Domenici 
used more of a voice of public administration, for example, by presenting CBO cost 
estimates for the reduced bill were for a 60 cent to 67 cent increase per member per 
month, even if increased utilization were assumed.  Domenici also shared the experiences of 
the states that had already implemented full parity -- well beyond what was required in his 
measure -- to emphasize its low cost.  Texas (full parity and chemical dependency benefits 
for state and local government employees) reportedly had incurred a 47.9 percent reduction 
in overall yearly mental health expenditures.  Maryland [full parity for all state regulated 
plans] experienced an increase of 0.6 percent per member per month.  Massachusetts [full 
parity for severe mental illness] showed a 5 percent increase in utilization, but a 22 percent 
decrease in mental health expenditures, and Rhode Island [full parity for severe mental 
illness and chemical dependency] showed a cost increase of 0.33 percent (Congressional 
Record, Senate, August 2, 1996, Vol. 142, No. 117).  Domenici’s new bill was still tabled, 
despite its reliance on the voice of public administration documenting its low apparent cost. 
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Finally, on September 5, Senator Domenici attached a mental health parity 
amendment to an unrelated act, and Senator Gramm (R, TX) attached an amendment to 
the Domenici amendment which would provide an exemption if costs to a company 
increased one percent or more, offering that:  
I do understand.  I grew up in a household with someone who had mental 
illness.  I grew up in a household where nobody had health insurance.  We did 
not have health insurance for physical or mental ailments.  But the point is, if 
you are going to mandate coverage, then you will end up with more people 
who have no health insurance, and you are going to have more people 
without jobs (Congressional Record, Senate, September 5, 1996, Vol. 142, 
No. 120).   
 
Thus, a compromise form of potentially successful mental health legislation was reached 
and the Mental Health Parity Act was passed to be effective in 1998.  
Coverage in the WSJ during 1996 continued to oppose health reform measures, 
largely using a public administration form of rhetoric (e.g., March 19, 1996, Section A, p. 
18, col. 1; May 22, 1996, Section A, p. 22, col. 1; May 30, Section A, p. 14, col. 3). Select 
articles specifically targeted the mental health parity amendment to the Kennedy-
Kassebaum proposal, noting fierce opposition by the business community (May 2, 1996, 
Section B, p. 7, col. 1), or urging caution because mental health is poorly defined and thus 
insurance coverage is open to abuse (June 13, 1996, Section A, p. 15, col. 1). The Post, 
meanwhile, began the year with a statement of support for incremental health reform, 
noting that a bipartisan health reform measure, endorsed by the Senate Labor and Human 
Resources Committee with a unanimous vote, had been kept from the Senate floor for over 
five months, a clear exercise of covert power. The Post called this set of events 
“remarkable” and asked that the bill be brought to the floor for a vote (January 28, 1996, 
Editorial, Section C, p. C06).  The Post later expressed its outrage even more openly: 
Only the United States Senate would fix things so that it can’t take up a bill 
for health insurance reform that has bipartisan sponsorship, the backing of 70 
members, wide popular support, and the President as chief salesman.  The 
Senate’s capacity to gum things up is legendary, but the case of the Kennedy-
Kassebaum Health Insurance Reform Act is special.  It tells us of the dark 
underside of the world’s greatest deliberative body, where worthy bills are 
mugged by serial muggers who operate with cloak and dagger under cover of 
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secrecy and only get shown up when there is a slip-up (February 6, 1996, 
Section A, p. A02). 
 
Throughout March and April, the Post reported alternate proposals on the floors of 
both houses of Congress (March 28, 1996, Section A, p. A09; March 9, 1996, Section A, p. 
A08; April 19, 1996, Section A, p. A01; April 21, 1996, Section A, p. A10), and continued to 
support mental health parity (April 23, 1996, Section A, p. A01; April 26, 1996, Section A, 
p. A01), while acknowledging business opposition.   
While much of the coverage in the Times during 1996 was simply a factual reporting of 
events taking place in Congress, a number of articles expressed an opinion opposing MSAs:  
House Republicans know that if they venture much beyond the Senate bill 
they will lose bipartisan support.  Yet their bill would create tax-favored 
medical savings accounts, which would allow people who buy only 
catastrophic health policies to sequester funds to pay their ordinary medical 
bills.  This is a bad idea almost certain to be rejected by the Senate.  Medical 
savings accounts would appeal primarily to healthy people, because they 
would not need to tap most of the money in their tax-advantaged savings 
account.  That would leave less healthy people to buy ordinary medical 
coverage at elevated prices.  The goal of health reform ought to be the 
opposite—to standardize policies so that everyone buys the same basic 
package.  That way plans would be forced to compete by offering better 
treatment, rather than by tailoring coverage only to attract applicants unlikely 
to need treatment . . . If House Republicans are serious about protecting 
workers who lose or leave their jobs, they will vote for Kassebaum-Kennedy 
and nothing else.  (March 28, 1996, Section A, p. 24, col. 1) 
 
 
An editorial on May 30 assumed a pragmatic stance—mental health parity is the right thing 
to do, but this is not the right way to do it—again showing the Times’s preference for a 
more comprehensive, rather than an incremental, approach: 
The Senate is right that health-care policies should include adequate coverage 
of mental illness.  But the proper way to achieve that goal is for Congress to 
come up with a cost-effective package of Federally-defined basic health 
benefits.  Piecemeal mandates, conceived in haste, are likely to produce 
unintended adverse consequences.  
 
1997:  Waiting for Godot 
1997 was essentially a quiescent time, since mental health parity was to become the 
law the following January.  On January 21, the first session of the 105th Congress, Senator 
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Kennedy called for another incremental legislative push, to cover uninsured children 
(Congressional Record, Senate, January 21, 1997, Vol. 143, Number 4): 
One of every seven children in America today have no health insurance.  
Almost all of these children have parents who work.  Cutbacks in employer 
coverage are worsening this problem . . . Providing health care for children is 
sound public policy and also sound economics.  It’s an investment in the 
future . . .The plan does not guarantee every child will have insurance 
coverage.  But it will give every family the opportunity to cover their children 
at a cost the family can afford. 
 
Again, we hear the voice of realpolitik.  But it has become muted and slightly 
contaminated with public administration rhetoric.  Backing away from a call for universal 
coverage, it seeks coverage solely for those who not only are personally without fault, but 
whose families also fit the mold -- innocent children whose parents are employed.  In 
addition, it does not argue that costs are unimportant, or even that they are insignificant. 
Instead, it says that money spent on insurance for children will provide a return -- that it is 
an “investment.”   
Coverage in the media was likewise sparse.  The WSJ carried only five articles about 
mental health during 1997, two of which were directly related to the Mental Health Parity 
Act.  They reported (November 11, 1997, Section B, p. 6, col. 6) a study in the New 
England Journal of Medicine which found that providing workers with more generous mental 
health coverage cost only about $1 per employee per year.  In December the second 
reported that President Clinton had decided that employers must comply with the law before 
seeking an exemption because of higher costs (December 15, 1997, Section A, p. 24, col. 
2).   
While not publishing articles on mental health parity, the Post (August 20, 1997, Op-
Ed, p. A25) did report that the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 would provide $24 billion over 
the next five years to insure currently uninsured children.  In late October (October 22, 
1997, Op-ed, p. A21), a realpolitik-based editorial lamented the current state of health 
benefits, and requested support for a proposal that would confront some of the perceived 
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abuses of managed care, despite the expected opposition of business and the insurance 
industry. 
The Times, meanwhile had more coverage about mental health, but little of it dealt 
with the Parity Act. Amid a few articles somewhat related to mental health, the Times 
continued to advocate improved benefits for those with mental illness, but recognized that 
such change would not be easy.  An editorial on December 23 (Section A, p. 19) called 
mental illness “the last taboo” for those in political office. 
1998:  “Unintended Consequences” Prevail 
It became apparent early in 1998 that the two pieces of already passed legislation 
would experience difficulty during implementation.  On March 25 and 26 (Congressional 
Record, Senate, Vol. 144, Nos. 35 and 36), the public administration-rooted Nickels 
amendment to an appropriations bill proposed deleting $65 million from the budget 
earmarked for hiring an additional 65 Health Care Funding Administration (HCFA) 
employees.  Without those new employees, enforcement of Kassebaum-Kennedy Bill and 
Mental Health Parity Act would be curtailed.  Some argued that they could shift around 
employees, but others observed that employees with suitable specialized skills did not 
already exist within the agency.  Others thought that the regulations were too new, and 
states should be given additional time to address them.    
Concern in Congress about cutbacks in mental health coverage became apparent.  
On Friday, June 5 (Congressional Record, House, Vol. 144, No. 72), Representative 
Roukema (R, NJ) introduced a study which found that health insurance for mental health 
was being cut far faster than that for physical injury and illness.  While the value of general 
health benefits had declined 7 percent (from $2,326.86 to $2,155.60 per covered person), 
the value of mental health benefits had declined 54 percent (from $154.08 to $69.61 per 
covered person) between 1997 and 1998.  The cost of achieving parity would thus represent 
a 3.4 percent increase in premiums.  Adding substance abuse to parity would require 
another 3.6 percent increase. 
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Coverage in the press during 1998 was quite sparse.  The Times had only one 
related article that year (December 26, 1998, Section A, p. 1, col. 6) which reported that 
insurance companies and employers had found ways to “get around” the 1996 law: 
Under [The Mental Health Parity Act], group health plans may not set annual 
or lifetime dollar limits on a member’s mental health care that are less than 
any such limits for general medical and surgical services.  So, many group 
plans, fearing higher costs, have simply replaced the dollar limits for mental 
health care with numerical limits:  on outpatient visits, treatment sessions, or 
days in the hospital.  ‘The day and visit limits wind up being more restrictive 
in some cases than the dollar limits for which they substituted’ said Ronald E. 
Bachman, an actuary at the accounting firm of PriceWaterhouseCoopers.  ‘The 
net impact in these cases is to have less mental health coverage’  
 
The Post recognized the problem in an article by noted financial writer Jane Bryant 
Quinn who listed a number of ways the law could be circumvented and suggested that true 
parity would not be achieved because of inherent loopholes. 
The Post never faltered in its call for comprehensive health reform, as shown by an 
editorial on July 29 (Op-Ed, p. A21): 
It is not an accident that every other summer, regular as clockwork, just as 
Congress is winding down for its longest pre-election break, a major fight 
breaks out over health care legislation . . . The key dimensions of a realistic 
discussion are three:  cost, coverage and quality.  All three are inextricably 
linked.  But Washington has chosen to deal with them one at a time—and by 
doing so, it has almost guaranteed that realistic solutions will not be found. 
 
In the end, loopholes in the Mental Health Parity Act rendered it  
 
ineffectual, and full parity bills introduced in and after 1998 were never  
 
subjected to Congressional debate. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 Our analysis strongly suggests the important role played by the public administration 
and realpolitik forms of rhetoric in socially constituting the processual order of mental health 
policy in the United States (March and Olson, 1983; Hall, 1972, 1987).  Perhaps not 
surprisingly, those of the Republican Party appeared to predominantly use the public 
administration voice to advance their political agenda, while Democrats used realpolitik. 
What was surprising, however, was the use of a modified form of realpolitik by Republicans 
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(that they used to augment rather than displace the public administration voice), wherein 
they voiced concern not for the values and needs of the human citizenry, but the needs and 
values of employers in resisting progressive and, for employers, costly health care reforms 
advanced by Democrats. As part of this voice, and apparently unanticipated by March and 
Olson, Republicans used the concept of efficiency drawn from their public administration 
rhetoric, but linked it with a rationale of “market efficiency” rather than “administrative 
efficiency” as a disciplining mechanism for containing health care costs (Berkenhotter and 
Huckin, 1995; Freedman and Medway, 1994), thus marking an evolution in rhetoric which 
matched an evolution in the underlying issues (Strauss, 1993, p. 228). 
More specifically, an important dynamic of this use of rhetoric involves the relative 
distribution of power between the two political parties and a general fear of the unknown.  
Early in the legislative process in 1994, “mental health parity” was generally seen as nearly 
inevitable.  But this position failed to grasp the socio/political dynamics of the situation.  
Especially prominent here was the way in which the political factions defined the issues 
differently (Strauss, 1993, p. 228).  Bill Clinton had a bare majority of the votes, but acted 
as though he had a public mandate for dramatic change.  Democrats focused their concern 
on the 15 percent of the population who lacked health insurance, and using the voice of 
“realpolitik” (March and Olson, 1983; Hall, 1972, 1987), called for radical change to what 
they rhetorically described as a “severe problem.”  Republicans interpreted the environment 
much differently.  They saw the “glass” as 85 percent full.  In 1994, President Clinton’s 
proposal was seen as radical, especially to the small business community and the insurance 
industry, who committed themselves to a pitched lobbying effort.  Moreover, citizen-
taxpayers were mobilized by political actors and described in newspaper accounts (Hall, 
1972) as: fearful that they would lose the right to choose their own doctor, that decisions 
about their care would not be made by their physician but instead by bureaucrats, and that 
costs, not medical efficacy, would drive those decisions. The rational-appearing voice of 
“public administration” prevailed, partly because the majority accepted the Republican 
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definition of the problem, and partly because the Democratic “solution” to the “wrong 
problem” was described by its opponents as having the potential for making things worse 
(Strauss, 1993, p. 228).  Thus, conservative actions were effectively advanced which can be 
evaluated and modified incrementally, whereas the Democrats had asked for radical, 
comprehensive actions from which it would be hard to retreat. 
In 1994, no one expected the dramatic economic changes that would take place in 
health insurance, or the rapid rate of those changes which would drive an evolution in the 
political issues (Strauss, 1993, p. 229).  Managed care redesigned the health benefits 
landscape in just a few years in what may be seen as an “intersecting of arenas” (Strauss, 
1993, p. 229).  Under “early managed care,” many people had to choose between staying 
with a family physician and having their health costs paid by their insurance.  Many found 
that care had to be pre-approved, and was at times denied by an anonymous insurance 
company employee whose training and motivation they questioned.   
As managed care became the dominant form of insurance over the next few years, 
the administrative controls and bureaucracy associated with it, previously advanced by 
Democrats, were no longer regarded as radical.  As managed care became institutionalized, 
the voice of “public administration” no longer railed against it.  Managed care was now 
generally accepted as the new status quo, which the voice of public administration has a 
general tendency to support (March and Olson, 1983). Thus, the Republicans had actively 
“matched” their political agenda with the evolving socio/economic world of managed care 
(Strauss, 1993, p. 229). 
Another reason that the Republican change-of-heart was more symbolic than real, is 
that modifications in the “market mechanisms” under managed care were instituted by 
insurance companies.  Since these changes were “market-based,” and Republicans had 
repeatedly called for “letting the market work” using the transformed version of realpolitik 
they were likely to be regarded as acceptable.  Very similar changes advocated by the 
Clinton plan would have been accomplished outside of “the market mechanism” and thus 
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were seen as less acceptable by Republicans.  In other words, Republicans based decisions 
about legitimacy more on the process -- the mechanisms employed that expressed a 
conservative business ethos -- than the outcomes sought.  
Another aspect of the modifications made was that early adopters of managed care 
did indeed experience large cost savings.  Later adopters expected similar benefits, and 
most anticipated the savings to be long term.  In the late 1990s, it was not yet apparent 
that medical costs would begin to rise quickly once the early savings had been wrung out of 
the system.  (It is interesting to note here that Senator Packwood was almost prescient.  
Indeed, it is almost exactly as he predicted: After 5 or 6 years, the crisis re-emerged and 
was worse than before, as doctors increasingly left their profession and people scrambled to 
find basic health care.)  The voice of public administration, with its emphasis on rationality 
and costs, would have had a hard time disavowing the cost savings, record keeping, and 
data availability associated with managed care.  Because they could not wholly control the 
flow of information, Republicans had to adapt and adjust (Hall, 1972; Hall and McGinty, 
1997). Those using this voice would feel a responsibility to spend the government’s money 
wisely and control costs.  
When the issue arose again in 1996, the balance of power had swung even more 
heavily to the Republicans.  As discussed above, the Republicans were motivated to bring 
some health reform to fruition, but to make sure it did not resemble the radical plan for 
universal coverage offered by President Clinton two years earlier.  Democrats still favored 
more sweeping change, but recognized that nothing would be accomplished unless 
compromise was reached.  It is important, again, to recognize that Democrats rhetorically 
defined the problem far differently from Republicans, and saw it as far more severe.  They 
were willing to settle for minor change in order to slow the increase in the number without 
insurance -- a far harder goal to achieve than that of helping those who have insurance to 
keep it. But, the terms of debate had been fixed by Republicans despite sweeping change in 
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the environment, and the Democrats had altered their strategy to get something 
accomplished, albeit in a more modest fashion (Hall, 1987; Strauss, 1993, p. 229).  
During the 1996 debate, mental health parity became a symbol of those political 
differences.  Democrats believed that parity was “the right thing to do” and needed a 
symbolic victory.  In turn, their traditional voice of realpolitik was augmented with that of 
public administration to indicate that Democrats, even Ted Kennedy, were concerned with 
constraining costs; they saw it necessary to “pull back from their own terrain” (Strauss, 
1993, p. 229) and cooperate with Republicans to get something, even a more modest 
measure, passed. Considering the legislative process, and especially the form of the 
legislation which ultimately passed, one would have to be naïve to believe that any benefits 
would actually accrue to those with mental illness.  The loopholes in the legislation were 
substantial and obvious.  Circumventing the law during implementation would thus be 
extremely easy.   
In the final analysis, the mental health parity law was doomed to failure.  Even in the 
changed landscape of managed care, parity represented radical change and the unknown.  
Though cost estimates from reliable sources were consistently de minimis, and the 
experience of states which had implemented parity laws was uniformly positive, even 
supporters had to admit that estimates were difficult to formulate because such coverage 
was rare, and because parity would move the health care coverage system into largely 
uncharted territory. 
At a general level, the processual ordering branch of symbolic interaction appears 
quite useful in understanding the rhetorical/socio-political dynamics of health care reform at 
the federal level and the issue of parity in mental health insurance.  It appears that the use 
of appropriate rhetoric has strongly shaped the development of national health policy in this 
arena (March and Olson, 1983; Hall, 1972).  More specifically, processual ordering (e.g., 
Strauss 1993; Maines 1982; Manning 1992; Prus 1999; and Ulmer 1997) has proven useful 
in gaining a more robust understanding of the social construction of health care legislation 
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by means of the rhetorical strategies used to condition the strategies of manipulation, 
exchange relations, bargaining and power-brokering. According to this perspective, the 
health condition of human existence was indeed found to create a need for political action, 
and political actions created the material conditions for human existence in the form of 
providing and withholding financial resources (Hall, 1972; Strauss, 1993) -- thereby 
affecting human mental health.  But here, symbolic displays using specific rhetorical forms 
were found essential, wherein political and press interactions were largely interpretive, 
assigning meaning to health care coverage debates and issues (Hall 1972, 1987; Strauss 
1993).  These interpretations have become “sedimented” into the very institutional 
structure of regulations that will ultimately influence health care delivery for decades (Hall 
and Wing 2001; Prus 1999; Ulmer 1997, 2005).  Thus, interpretation may be seen not as a 
product, but a very fluid human social process involving contending political factions 
(Strauss, 1993, p. 228).  Here, defining key, evolving issues, and matching the social 
worlds of voting constituencies and the press (Strauss, 1993), necessitated the study of 
power, and the use of differentiated language forms, and the political actors wielding them 
(Hall and McGinty, 1997; Prus, 1999). 
IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY 
As we had hoped, the Realpolitik and Public Administration forms of rhetoric proved 
quite useful in understanding how these contending political factions shaped the debate 
over public mental health policy.  It quickly became apparent that the theories of March and 
Olsen (1983), which continue to describe voices commonly used in our political processes. 
The fact that the United States was at a point where political parties had adopted 
quite polarized initial positions made this analysis even more fruitful from a theoretical 
perspective than might have been otherwise true.  Had this debate taken place some years 
earlier -- thus the debate undertaken from more centrist positions -- we would have been 
less able to observe the modification of the pure rhetorical forms into more blended 
positions.  Thus, both the choice to examine a public policy forum, and the timing of the 
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specific events that were chosen, added elements to our understanding.  The timing allowed 
us to go beyond March and Olsen (1983) and consider the effects of modifying each 
rhetorical form with elements of the other into a blended, more centrist position.  As 
described more fully below, the effects include changes in perceptions about the factions 
among the citizenry and changes in their relative power that flowed from those perceptions. 
 
 
 
  
  
Democrats opened the debate using a pure Realpolitik form of rhetoric.  They 
described the lack of health insurance by about one-sixth of U. S. citizens as a crisis, and 
the spottiness of mental health coverage even for those who do have health insurance as a 
moral failing.  They compared our health insurance system unfavorably to other developed 
countries, placing us on a caliber with only South Africa, a country which we tend to look 
down upon.  They did not discuss costs much in the beginning.  Such a discussion is a 
natural part of the rhetorical form of Public Administration but has no place in a moral 
argument.  This form of rhetoric is predictable in the situation, because Democrats were 
attempting to bring about large changes, and citizens are likely to accept large change 
under duress, in times of crisis, or because of strong moral beliefs. 
Republicans interpreted the situation as a problem but not a crisis, leading them to 
begin the debate with Public Administration rhetoric.  If one-sixth has no insurance, then 
Republican Movement  
Strengthened 
Argument 
Realpolitik Realpolitik 
modified by Public 
Administration 
 
Public 
Administration 
modified by 
Realpolitik 
 
Public 
Administration 
 
Democratic Movement 
Weakened Argument 
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obviously five-sixths do have it.  They focused on the generally high quality of our health 
care system, rather than on the specific failings of either the insurance system or the health 
care system.  They blurred the lines between these two systems, so that citizens saw them 
as one large overly complex system (the Clinton Plan made this very easy to do), as a 
means of making citizens anxious and confused.  Finally, they focused on the largest 
estimates of cost increases, because we are very tax averse.  Republicans apparently 
agreed with the Democrats that large changes make people uncomfortable.  They made the 
changes look as large, as unnecessary, and as costly, as possible to make them 
unpalatable.   
As the debate evolved, each faction modified its stance by moving toward the center.  
Democrats added discussions about how minor the cost estimates were.   Republicans 
showed sympathy for those who lacked coverage, but explained that it was unavoidable.  
The quote from Senator Gramm earlier in this paper (He did understand, but mandating 
coverage would just make things worse.) exemplifies those modifications.  
Thus, each faction moved toward the center as the debate neared its end.  However, 
the effects of that movement were quite different.  The Democrats, who had begun their 
debate from a point of principle, calling for major systemic change, found their position 
weakened.  An argument from principle cannot help but be weakened when costs become 
the focus of debate, because discussions of costs and benefits are inherently pragmatic.  
Democrats were perceived as abandoning their ideals, and lost constituency.  Republicans, 
on the other hand, found their position strengthened.  Since their primary position was that 
the status quo was pretty good, the centrist position to incrementally improve the system 
while causing no harm.  They expressed sympathy for those who lacked coverage, in the 
process appearing more caring and less hard hearted, thus gaining constituents.  They were 
also able to redefine the terms of the debate, to focus on preserving coverage for those who 
already have it, instead of extending coverage to additional people.   
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Thus, one addition to theory is that rhetorical voices tend to be modified as debates 
continue, with differing effects on opposing factions power. 
Three additional research questions related to rhetorical styles deserve 
consideration.  All are related to the effects already described.  The first is the question of 
whether the centrist movement typically causes power to swing in the same manner.  In 
this case, the voice of Realpolitik was weakened by modification, but the voice of Public 
Administration gained strength.  Is it typically true, as we suggested earlier, that principled 
stands are weakened by pragmatic considerations?  In other words, are victories by 
Realpolitik rare?  Or, as seems more likely, is it the case that these specific changes were 
related to the fact that the U. S. is currently a society where business interests often 
prevail, and Public Administration rhetoric is much more mainstream than Realpolitik.  
Studies in other cultures, at different times in U. S. history, or of situations where the 
Realpolitik voice clearly prevailed, would help to answer this question. 
Second, if it is true that Public Administration rhetoric will typically prevail over that 
of Realpolitik, it seems that another voice of debate should emerge.  In a political process, 
society is better served when differing opinions are heard and power is not overly 
concentrated.  Research into the emergence of other voices would be useful.   
Finally, it seems likely that factors such as the timing of the change in arguments, or 
the specific modifications made to arguments, have an effect on the outcome of debates.  
Further research into the movement from pure to modified rhetorical positions will help to 
determine these factors.   
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